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Winters: Winters: Third Circuit Buyers Beware

Third Circuit Buyers Beware: District
Court in Litman Holds
Unconscionability Defense
Contravened by Federal Arbitration
Act
Litman v. Cellco Partnership'
I. INTRODUCTION
Without even knowing it, just about everyone has agreed to settle disputes
through arbitration and has waived any rights to proceed on a class-wide basis.
While many consumers do not read the fine print in the agreements they sign, a
variety of companies, from cell phone providers to car dealers, have consumers
agree in sales contracts to arbitrate any claims and to waive the ability to proceed
with a class action claim. This was the scenario in the case of Litman v. Cellco
Partnership,in which a New Jersey federal district court held that the plaintiff cell
phone customers could not use a state-law unconscionability defense to invalidate
an agreement to arbitrate and a class action waiver, as the state law was preempted
by federal legislation. 2 Unfortunately, this holding misinterpreted state and federal law, as evidenced by prior precedent and cases decided after the fact.3 The
holding also set an unfortunate precedent for consumers, stripping them of the
only adequate remedy provided by law and subjecting them to a process that rarely rules in their favor.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Keith Litman and Robert Wachtel (Plaintiffs) were both Verizon Wireless
customers in 2004.4 At that time, both men paid a flat monthly rate for cell phone
service. 5 They alleged that in October 2005, Verizon mailed a notice to all of its
customers, stating that Verizon would begin assessing administrative charges to
the monthly bill. 6

I. No. 07-CV-4886(FLW), 2008 WL 4507573 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2008).
2. Id. at *6.
3. See, e.g., Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 98-104 (N.J. 2006)
(holding that state unconscionability defense can be used to invalidate an arbitration agreement that
contained a class action waiver); Homa v. Am. Express, 558 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that the
state unconscionability defense was not preempted by the FAA).
4. Litman, 2008 WL 5497573 at *1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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On October 7, 2007, both men filed a class action lawsuit against Verizon in
New Jersey federal district court.7 They alleged Verizon unlawfully assessed
them and other customers an "'administrative charge' of $0.40 and/or $0.70," as
part of their monthly phone bill. 8 Plaintiffs alleged that the charges were not part
of their original service agreement and that nothing in the agreement authorized
9
Verizon to implement such a charge.
In 2004, Verizon's service agreement required Plaintiffs and Verizon to settle
disputes by arbitration, except for certain small claims.' 0 In 2005, Verizon
amended its service agreement to state that "the Federal Arbitration Act applies to
th[e] agreement" and the agreement "doesn't permit class arbitration."" The
modified agreement further stated that "if for some reason the prohibition on class
arbitrations . . . is deemed unenforceable, then the agreement to arbitrate will not
apply." 2
In response to Plaintiffs' suit, Verizon filed a motion to compel arbitration instead of an answer.13 Even though the arbitration agreement was not in the Plaintiffs' original service agreement, Verizon claimed that their continued use of its
services acted as an acceptance of the new agreement, and thus the Plaintiffs'
claims should be arbitrated.14 Plaintiffs claimed that the New Jersey Supreme
Court held consumer contracts of adhesion that also require arbitration in low
value claims to be unconscionable and unenforceable.' 5 Verizon argued that the
Federal Arbitration Act required its arbitration agreement to be held enforceable,
and that the Third Circuit recently held that the FAA preempts state law that treats
arbitration differently than other agreements.
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey noted that New Jersey
state unconscionability law treats agreements to arbitrate differently than other
contractual provisions.' 7 Because of this unequal treatment, the court stated it was
bound by section 2 of the FAA and by Third Circuit precedent in finding that the
FAA preempted New Jersey state law. Because the FAA controlled, the court
held it could not rule the agreement unconscionable.1 9. Furthermore, the court
held that the FAA required enforcement of a valid agreement to arbitrate; thus the
court granted Verizon's motion to compel arbitration.20

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
I1. Id. (alteration in original) (original was in all capital letters).
12. Id. (original was in all capital letters).
13. Id.
14. See id. at *1 n.2.
15. Id. at *2; see Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006).
16. Litman, 2008 WL 4507573, at *1, *2.
17. Id. at *5; but see Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (stating a court may not construe
arbitration agreements differently than non-arbitration agreements under state law).
18. Id. at *6 (citing Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 393 (3d Cir. 2007).
19. Id. at *6 & n.6
20. Id. at *6-*7.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. FederalArbitrationAct
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 21 The act was
created to combat the longstanding hostility towards arbitration that existed at
English common law and in American courts; it sought to place agreements to
arbitrate on the same footing as other contractual agreements.22 Section 2 of the
FAA states that arbitration agreements covered by the act "shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable save upon grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 23 The Supreme Court has held that when Congress enacted
section 2 of the FAA, it "declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims
which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration."2 4 As such, section
2 of the FAA creates a strong presumption in favor of arbitration, and the Court
has also held that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in the favor of arbitration." 25
Southland Corp. v. Keating was an important U.S. Supreme Court case interpreting section 2 of the FAA.26 In Southland, several franchisees entered into an
agreement, containing an arbitration clause, with Southland to purchase 7-Eleven
Stores.27 One of the franchisees sued Southland for various claims, including a
violation of the California Franchise Investment Law (FIL). 28 The Supreme Court
of California held that the FIL violation claims were not arbitrable and that they
were not preempted by the FAA. 29 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the California court's decision. 30 The Court held that FIL claims were subject to arbitration
because the FIL's requirement that claims receive a judicial determination was in
conflict with the goals of the FAA and thus were preempted.31
This decision is pivotal to the court's interpretation of the FAA for two reasons. First, the decision explicitly states that the FAA is applicable in state courts,
as well as federal courts. 32 The Court, based on the legislative history of the FAA,
concluded that it was the intent of Congress to use the commerce clause to create
a rule that would be applicable in state and federal courts in order to prevent state
laws from undercutting the enforcement of arbitration agreements and undermining the goals of the FAA.33
The second reason this decision is important is that it reaffirms the notion that
the FAA will preempt state laws that conflict with substantive law and the goals of
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
Moses H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
Southland, 465 U.S. 1.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
at 5.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 12, 16.
Id. at 13-16.
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the FAA. 34 While the FAA does not have any direct preemption provisions, 35 the
FAA will preempt state law if the law specifically singles out arbitration, disfavors arbitration, or would require a judicial forum for an entire class of agreements.36 That being said, generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud,
misrepresentation, duress, and unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate an
The defenses must be
agreement to arbitrate without contravening the FAA.
equally
to agreements to arbigeneral defenses, though, meaning they must apply
trate and those that don't involve arbitration.
B. Third Circuit'sInterpretationof the FAA
Since the subject of this note is a case based in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, 39 the circuit's interpretation of the FAA bears great weight on
the outcome of the case. At the time of the Litman decision, Gay v. CreditInform
was the most recent and applicable example of how the Third Circuit interprets
the FAA and applies it to state contract law.
Gay v. CreditInform4 0 involved a plaintiff consumer who brought a class action suit in connection to a $39.92 charge she received after her purchase of credit
repair services. 4 ' The defendant lender moved to compel arbitration, as was required by the parties' service agreement, which also contained a class action
waiver. 42 The plaintiff argued that the class action waiver contained in the agreement was unconscionable under Pennsylvania law. 43 The Plaintiff cited two
Pennsylvania appellate court decisions that held class action waivers contained in
consumer contracts of adhesion were unconscionable and unenforceable." The
defendant argued that Virginia law should apply, as there was also a choice of law
provision in the agreement. 45 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in affirming the ruling of the district court, ruled for the defendant. 46 The court found
that Virginia law concerning unconscionability should apply, but it then held that

34. See id. at 16.
35. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
36. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 n.It1; F. Paul Bland, Jr., & Claire Prestel, Challenging Class Action
Bans in MandatoryArbitration Clauses, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLIcT RESOL. 369, 373 (2009).
37. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
38. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
39. Litman v. Cellco P'ship, No. 07-CV-4886(FLW), 2008 WL 4507573 at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 29,
2008).
40. 511 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2007).
41. Id. at 374-75, 393 n.17.
42. Id. at 375.
43. Id. at 390-92.
44. Id. at 392-93; see also Lytle v. CitiFinancial Servs., Inc., 810 A.2d 643, 665-66 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2002); Thibodeau v. Comcast Corp., 912 A.2d 874, 884-86 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
45. Gay, 511 F.3d at 390.
46. Id. at 375.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2010/iss1/12

4

Winters: Winters: Third Circuit Buyers Beware

No. 1]

Third CircuitBuyers Beware

227

under Virginia laW4 7 the contract was not unconscionable, meaning the agreement
48
to arbitrate was valid and enforceable.
While clearly dictum, the court stated that even if it was applying Pennsylvania law on unconscionability, the holding would still be the same.49 The court
noted that the two cases cited by the plaintiff did lend support to her claim that the
agreement to arbitrate was unconscionable.50 However, the court stated that the
FAA would preempt the Pennsylvania precedent, as the holdings cited by the
5
Plaintiff were inconsistent with the standards set forth in Southland. ' The court
found that the two Pennsylvania cases invalidated consumer agreements to arbitrate based upon a public policy that sought to encourage the enforcement of meri52
In the court's
torious claims that were cost-prohibitive to pursue individually.
view, the cases reflected a state policy that favored class action, and to hold that
waivers of class actions in an contract providing for arbitration are per se unconscionable would be to put arbitration agreements on different footing as other contracts.53 Thus the court concluded that the founding principles of the two cases
were not based upon "grounds [that] exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract" 54 and did not "reflect a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements." 55 So even if the court used Pennsylvania state law and precedent,
that law would be preempted by the FAA because it was in conflict with the substance and goals of section 2 of the FAA.56
C. New Jersey Law of Unconscionabilityand the FAA
While the case of Littman v. Cellco was adjudicated in federal court and dealt
with federal statutes, the application of New Jersey contract law was an important
element of the case.
New Jersey courts may refuse to enforce a contract if it is deemed unconscionable.58 Courts hold that unconscionability usually entails two factors. One is
procedural unconscionability, which can include a variety of inadequacies relating
to the person or the contractual negotiation.59 The second factor is substantive
unconscionability, which generally involve harsh or unfair, one-sided terms.6
47. The standard for unconscionability in Virginia is very high, as it requires the bargain to be "'one
that no man in his senses and not under a delusion would make, on one hand, and as no fair man would
accept, on the other.' The inequality must be so gross to shock the conscience." Mgmt. Enters., Inc. v.
Throncroft Co., 416 S.E.2d 229, 231 (Va. 1992) (quoting Smyth Bros. v. Beresford, 104 S.E. 371, 382
(Va. 1920)).
48. Gay, 511 F.3d at 391-92.
49. Id. at 492.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 393-94.
52. Id. at 392-94.
53. Id. at 393-94.
54. Id. at 394 (quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (emphasis in original)).
55. Id. at 394 (quoting Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 376 (3d Cir. 2000)).
56. Id. at 394-95.
57. Litman v. Cellco P'ship, No. 07-CV-4886(FLW) 2008 WL 4507573 at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 29,
2008)
58. Saxon Constr. & Mgmt. Corp. v. Masterclean of N.C., Inc., 641 A.2d 1056, 1058 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1994).
59. Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915, 902-22. (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002).
60. Id.
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When deciding if a consumer contract falls under either type of unconscionability,
the courts use a four-factor test, developed in the case of Rudbart v. North Jersey
District Water Supply Commission,61 after first determining whether the contract
is one of adhesion.62 New Jersey Courts define a contract of adhesion as a contract presented to consumers on a "take it or leave it" basis, in a standardized form
with no real opportunity to negotiate.63 Once it is determined that the contract in
question is one of adhesion, courts will weigh the "subject matter of the contract,
the party's relative bargaining positions, the degree of economic compulsion motivating the 'adhering' party, and the public interests affected by the contract."6
Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware is the leading
New Jersey case dealing with the balancing of state unconscionability claims and
the FAA. The case involved a plaintiff consumer who brought a class action suit
against a lender for violating various state and federal statutes by allegedly charging the plaintiff exorbitant interest rates.66 The agreement the plaintiff signed had
an agreement to arbitrate and a waiver of class action claims, including class arbitration. The defendant bank filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the
68
The SuFAA, which the trial court granted and the appellate court affirmed.
preme Court of New Jersey heard the plaintiff's appeal and reversed the decision
of the appellate court, holding that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable.69
The court stated that U.S. Supreme Court precedent states that the FAA does
not preclude a judicial court from determining the validity of an arbitration
agreement by using general contract defenses. 70 Once the court laid the foundational authority to review the agreement, the court used the four Rudbart factors to
determine if the agreement was unconscionable. 7 ' The court determined that there
was evidence to support a finding of unconscionability as to the first three factors-the subject matter of the agreement, the bargaining power, and the compulsion of the parties-because there was a disparity in bargaining power and a high
degree of economic compulsion.
The court stated that the most important issue is the public policy question-the fourth factor-and determined that public policy renders the contract
unconscionable.72 The court reasoned that most class action suits involve small
claims from consumers who would not be able to exercise their rights individual-

61. 605 A.2d 681 (NJ. 1992).
62. Id. at 685-86.
63. Id. at 685.
64. Id. at 687.
65. 912 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006).
66. Id. at 90-91.
67. Id. at 91-93.
68. Id. at 94.
69. Id. at 100-01.
70. Id. at 94-95 (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003) (plurality opinion) (holding that whether parties entered into a valid arbitration agreement is a gateway "question
that requires judicial determination"); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)
(stating that "generally applicable contract defenses ... may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening" the FAA)).
71. Id. at 98-100.
72. Id. at 99-100.
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ly.73 In addition, the purpose of the complete waiver of any kind of class action is
a means for companies to insulate themselves from liability, because without class
actions, few (if any) consumers would elect to arbitrate their claims individually.74
Thus, because of the class action waiver, the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated the agreement for being unconscionable.75
D. Post-Litman Developments
Homa v. American Express presented a very similar situation as Litman, but
the court reached the opposite conclusion when it held that New Jersey state law
regarding unconscionability was not preempted by the FAA.7 6 The case started
when G.R. Homa filed a class action suit against American Express, claiming the
company misrepresented the terms of the company's cash back program and that
the company never paid money owed him.77 The credit card agreement Homa
signed contained an agreement to arbitrate any disputes, a class action waiver, and
a choice of law provision.78 American Express filed a motion to compel arbitration, and the district court granted its motion, dismissing the case in favor of individual arbitration. 79 The Third Circuit reversed the decision of the district court,
and remanded the case for further proceedings. 80
During the case, American Express contended that the FAA requires preemption of New Jersey state law, as the court found in Gay.8 ' The court disagreed,
stating that Gay does not stand as a "blanket prohibition on unconscionability
challenges to class-arbitration provisions."82 The court held that Gay was distinguishable because the case involved laws that disfavored arbitration, whereas the
New Jersey law, as applied in Muhammad, did not disfavor arbitration and thus
was not preempted by the FAA."
The Court in Homa found that Muhammad did not stand for the proposition
that an agreement to arbitrate is unconscionable simply because it is an agreement
to arbitrate, a holding that would require preemption by the FAA. 84 Instead, the
court read Muhammad to allow all general contract defenses and would apply to
all class action waivers, not just those in contracts that compel arbitration.85 To
this court, the arbitration agreement in Muhammad was unconscionable because it
deprived the plaintiffs of any class action mechanism, violating a public policy
interest in ensuring consumers are able to pursue their statutory rights when low
value claims are involved.86
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 99.
Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 100-01.
Homa v. Am. Express, 558 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 226-27.
Id. at 227.
Id.
Id. at 233
Id. at 230.
Id.
Id. at 230-31.
Id.
See id. at 230.
Id. at 230, 232
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IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey began by reviewing the
facts, background, and procedural history of the case, and then began an overview
of the FAA. The court concluded that established precedent dictates that under
the FAA, agreements to arbitrate are valid and irrevocable, unless the agreement
violates contract principles applicable to all contracts.
The court proceeded to
give a brief overview of both Muhammad and Gay.89 The court concluded that the
sole issue before the court is whether Muhammad should be controlling, thus rendering the contract unconscionable, or whether Muhammad is contrary to the FAA
and should be preempted."
The court interpreted Gay to hold that the FAA is controlling when state law
interprets an arbitration agreement differently than and other agreement, and
therefore the arbitration agreement should be enforced. I The court noted that
"the Circuit left very little room for this Court to invalidate an arbitration clause
on the basis of a class waiver provision, even if it is unconscionable under state
law." 92
The plaintiff attempted to distinguish Gay, arguing that the Pennsylvania cases cited in Gay were not neutral to arbitration and that Muhammad was entirely
neutral with respect to arbitration agreements. 93 The court did not find that argument persuasive, as it stated that one of the Pennsylvania cases was seemingly
neutral, but the court had to parse the provisions to find only the part of the
agreement about arbitration unconscionable. 94 From the court's perspective, the
same sort of parsing was at play in Muhammad: the court noted that the agreement in Muhammad had a broad class action and class arbitration waiver, but the
New Jersey court only focused on the class arbitration waiver. 95
The court contended that the New Jersey court parsed through the contractual
provisions to see what the provisions included and ruled it unconscionable for
what the contract provided: that is, arbitration over litigation. 96 These factors lead
this court to conclude that the New Jersey court treated arbitration agreements
differently from other contractual provisions. Because of this discrepancy in
treatment of the arbitration agreement, the court felt itself bound by the precedent
established in Gay and held that the FAA should preempt the New Jersey state law
that did not conform with the FAA, and granted the defendant's motion to compel
arbitration.97

87. Litman v. Cellco P'ship, No. 07-CV-4886(FLW), 2008 WL 4507573 at *1-*2 (D.N.J. Sept. 29,
2008).
88. Id. at *2-*3.
89. Id. at *3, *4-*6.
90. Id. at *4.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at *5-*6.
94. Id. at *6.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *7.
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V. COMMENT
In Litman, the district court had the opportunity to distinguish Gay and reaffirm the New Jersey state law and principles stated in Muhammad. The court
could have read Gay as standing for the proposition that the FAA will only
preempt state law if the law in question legitimately favors a judicial resolution
over an arbitral forum. This would be a fair reading of Gay, as the Pennsylvania
laws at issue did give a preference to a judicial forum. 98
Instead, the court read Gay as holding that a class action waiver can be enforceable under the FAA notwithstanding the generally applicable state contract law
defense of unconscionability. This reasoning is clearly demonstrated when the
court opined that "the Circuit left very little room for this Court to invalidate an
arbitration clause on the basis of a class waiver provision, even if it is unconscionable under state law." 99
The court also could have read Muhammad to hold that the class action waiver was unconscionable because it striped consumers of statutory rights and remedies.'" Instead the court read Muhammad to hold that the class waiver was unconscionable for what it provided-arbitration over a judicial forum-and thus
was not consistent with the FAA.o'0 However, upon a close reading, it becomes
clear that Muhammad is consistent with the FAA; that the court misinterpreted the
holding of Muhammad; and that the court's holding in Litman sets a problematic
precedent for Third Circuit consumers.
According to the district court, the court in Muhammad treated arbitration differently than other contractual provisions.' 02 This view does not seem to be in
accordance with much of the language and holding within the Muhammad opinion. This is laid out in the court's primary holding that "it was unconscionable
for defendants to deprive Muhammad of the mechanism of a class-wide action,
whether in arbitrationor in court litigation."'03 Furthermore, the court stated that
its holding was consistent with the "New Jersey's public policy favoring arbitration"1" and that the case was decided "as a matter of generally applicable state
contract law."'i05 But perhaps the most telling indication that the court does not
disfavor arbitration is the fact that, after the court held that the class action waiver
was unconscionable, the court directed the class action suit to proceed in the form
of class arbitration-not as a judicial class action.
There is also evidence outside the Muhammad opinion to indicate that the
New Jersey courts do not treat agreements to arbitrate differently than other
agreements. On the same day the New Jersey supreme court decided Muhammad,
the court issued its opinion in Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris.07 In Delta Funding, the court upheld a similar class action waiver, directed the case to individual
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 375 (3d Cir. 2007).
Litman, 2008 WL 4507573, at *4.
See Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 98-104 (N.J. 2006).
Litman, 2008 WL 4507573 at *6.
Id.
Muhammad 912 A.2d at 100-01 (emphasis added).
Id. at 101.
Id. at 100-01
Id. at 101-02
912 A.2d 104 (2006).
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arbitration, and stated that "under New Jersey law, the class-arbitration waiver ...
is not unconscionable per se."' 08 The court distinguished the two cases, reasoning
that the plaintiff in Delta Funding was seeking damages in excess of $100,000 and
had an incentive to pursue the case, which was to save her house from forecloSUC109
0
sure.

This illustrates the fact that New Jersey courts do not hold class wavers unconscionable simply because they provide arbitration instead of a judicial resolution. Instead, regardless of the type of contract provision at play, the court undertakes a unconscionability analysis dependent on a fact-sensitive analysis in each
instance, which includes the amount of damages being pursued, other relief available, and the complexity of the issues."1 0 The main reason the court in Muhammad held the class waiver unconscionable was because it acted as a "remedy
stripping" provision, which ultimately would have prevented consumers from
litigating their low-value claims.
The Third Circuit affirmed this reading of Muhammad in the case of Homa v.
American Express, where the court held that New Jersey state law regarding unconscionability was not preempted by the FAA.112 To reiterate, that court held
that Muhammad clearly did not stand for the proposition that an agreement to
arbitrate is unconscionable for the simple fact it is an agreement to arbitrate." 3
Instead, the court viewed the defense provided for in Muhammad to be a general
contract defense, not just for contracts involving arbitration, but one that would
apply to all class action waivers 114
The Homa court's analysis is in stark contrast to the analysis explicated by
the district court in Litman. In Litman, the court viewed Muhammed as treating
arbitration agreements differently and held that the FAA should preempt New
Jersey state law.115 The court in Homa, however, realized that reasoning behind
Muhammad was not rooted in hostility towards arbitration, but in the state's interest in ensuring that companies are not allowed to prevent consumers from pursuing valuable claims.11 6 For if consumers were forced to pursue their small value
claims individually, it would become economically unfeasible for consumers to do
so.11 7 The Homa court realized that enforcement of arbitration agreements and
class action waivers in many consumer agreements is not favorable for consumers.
Many legal commentators have argued that mandatory arbitration and broad
class action waivers are dissatisfactory for consumers.
One of the reasons is
108. Id. at 115.
109. Id.
110. See Muhammad, 912 A.2d at 100 n.5.
111. Allison Burtka, Third CircuitRejects Preemption, Choice of Law in Arbitration Case, 45 TRIAL
18, 18. (May, 2009).
112. Homa v. Am. Express, 558 F.3d 225, 233 (3d Cir. 2009).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 227.
115. Litman v. Cellco P'ship, No. 07-CV-4886(FLW), 2008 WL 4507573, *5-*6 (D.N.J. Sept. 29,
2008).
116. Homa, 558 F.3d at 230
117. Id. at 230-32
118. See generally Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Arbitrationto Eliminate Consumer Class
Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75
(2004); Daniel Higginbotham, Note, Buyer Beware: Why the Class Arbitration Waiver Clause
Presents a Gloomy Futurefor Consumers, 58 DUKE L.J. 103 (2008); F. Paul Bland, Jr., & Claire
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that consumers often know little about the provisions of their agreements.11 9
Many consumers do not anticipate litigation and do not realize how valuable their
litigation rights are when they agree to arbitrate.120 Many consumers also may not
realize when they are the victims of illegal activity. Without class action, and the
ability to alert consumers of potential illegal conduct at the hands of businesses,
many potential victims would go without compensation and many of the malefactors would go unpunished.121 This is another point of contention among critics of
arbitration: without any class action mechanism, many valid claims will never be
pursued.
Even though it would not allow the class action to proceed, the court in Litman admitted that its holding is unfair for the consumer. The court said that compelling individual arbitration was "tantamount to ending the Plaintiffs' pursuit of
their claims," noting that there was very little chance that any Plaintiff would individually arbitrate over damages less than $100, and described this outcome as
"harsh." 1 22 The statements of the district court in Litman sum many of the arguments against class action waivers. Much of the damage done to each individual
consumer is small, but the damage is large when considering all the consumers as
a whole. For example, it would not be economically feasible for a consumer who
was over-charged $0.50 a month to hire a lawyer and pay the costs associated with
arbitration. Many lawyers have testified in cases challenging class action bans
that no lawyer would take such a case individually, even if the claim was completely valid.123 There is also strong support from the U.S. Supreme Court for the
proposition that class actions are necessary to ensure an adequate remedy for those
with small claims.124 If consumers are not allowed to aggregate their small
claims, they will not be able to obtain the proper compensation and businesses
will continue to profit from their wrongful conduct.
Even if a consumer decides to and is able to pursue a case in arbitration, there
is evidence that would suggest the process itself is unfair. While the secret nature
of arbitration makes it difficult to get a full statistical picture, the available numbers do not show the process as favorable to consumers. Data made public in
California show that one of the nation's largest arbitration firms, the National
Arbitration Forum (NAF), ruled against consumers in ninety-five percent of its
California cases. 125
There is also concern about the connection between arbitration firms and the
companies that frequently use them.126 Consumer advocates fear that arbitrators
will be inclined to rule favorably for companies who frequently use their services.
Prestel, Challenging Class Action Bans in Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 369 (2009).
119. Bland & Prestel, supra note 118, at 386.
120. Higginbotham, supra note 118, at 117.
121. Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 118, at 88-89.
122. Litman v. Cellco P'ship, No. 07-CV-4886(FLW), 2008 WL 4507573, at *7 n.6 (D.N.J. Sept. 29,
2008).
123. Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 118, at 87.
124. Bland & Prestel, supranote 118, at 378.
125. Paul Wenske, When You Sign up for a Credit Card, You Sign Upfor Arbitration, KANSAS CITY
STAR, Oct. 6, 2007, availableat http://www.freerepublic.confocus/f-chat/1907924/posts.
126. Carrick Mollenkamp, Dionne Searcey, & Nathan Koppel, Turmoil in Arbitration Empire Upends
Credit Card Disputes, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 15, 2009, at A14. available at http://online.wsj.

com/article/SBl25548128115183913.html.
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Former NAF arbitrator and Harvard Law Professor Elizabeth Bartholet gave some
credence to those concerns when she testified before Congress.' 27 She claimed
that she had ruled in favor of credit card companies in eighteen straight decisions,
only to have NAF stop sending her cases shortly after she ruled in favor of a consumer.128
A recent study, using available data from NAF, backed up Bartholet's claims.
The study showed that NAF's ten most used arbitrators, who arbitrated sixty percent of the cases, only ruled in favor of consumers 1.6 percent of the time, as opposed to arbitrators who arbitrated fewer than three cases, who ruled in favor of
consumers thirty-eight percent of the time.129 While these numbers represent a
small sample of the total number of arbitration cases, they are enough to suggest
that arbitration is a forum that is not favorable to consumer claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
The district court in New Jersey held that the state's law on unconscionability
did not conform to the federal guidelines given in the FAA. Therefore the court
held that Third Circuit precedent controlled over state law, and granted Verizon's
motion to compel arbitration. There are serious questions as to the prudence of
this ruling. The court seemed to misinterpret the holding in Muhammad as being
in conflict with the FAA. However, the holding in Muhammad is consistent with
the defenses allowed by the FAA and should not have been preempted. This idea
was validated by the Third Circuit when it held in Homa that New Jersey law on
unconscionability is not unfavorable to arbitration and should not be preempted by
the FAA.
Furthermore, the district court failed to consider New Jersey's public policy
against class action waivers, as individual arbitration can strip consumers of remedy, allow the continued abuse of consumers at the hands of large corporations,
and appears to be a forum that is unfavorable to consumers. The Third Circuit
will have an opportunity to correct the mistakes of the district court, as the Litman
plaintiffs have their appeal docketed for this year. A reversal of the district
court's decision will go a long way to correct the erroneous analysis undertaken
by the district court and protect consumers by ensuring that they have a right to
pursue valid claims that would otherwise not be feasible if the holding in Litman
is affirmed.
DAVID C. WINTERS

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Richard Aldennan, Why We Really Need the Arbitration FairnessAct, 12 J. CONSUMER & COM.
L. 151, 155 (2009).
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